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As the articles in this symposium illustrate, the Wisconsin Su
preme Court's decision in State v. Oakley, 1 in which the court up
held a probation order prohibiting Mr. Oakley from fathering
additional children until he could support them? is a compelling

* Associate Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law.
J.S.M.1995, Stanford Law School; J.D. 1991, Columbia Law School; B.A. 1986,
Dartmouth College.
1. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001). Mr. Oakley, the father of nine
children, failed to pay any child support during the relevant time period and was in
arrears in excess of $25,000. [d. at 201-02. Mr. Oakley challenged the constitutionality
of the condition of his probation that he not father another child unless he could show
that he could support that child and his current children, arguing that the condition
violated his right to procreate. [d. at 201. The Wisconsin supreme court held that the
probation condition was not overbroad, as it did not eliminate Oakley's ability to exer
cise his constitutional right to procreate. [d. at 212-213. The court found that Mr.
Oakley could satisfy the condition of probation by making efforts to support his chil
dren as required by law. [d. at 212. The condition was reasonably related to the proba
tionary goal of rehabilitation because it would assist Oakley in conforming is conduct to
the law. [d. at 213. Further, the condition was determined to be narrowly tailored to
serve the compelling state interest of requiring parents to support their children as well
as rehabilitating those convicted of crimes. [d.
2. The precise terms and potential effects of the order are contested.
1
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example of a troubling flaw in our constitutional jurisprudence.
Absent the countervailing check perhaps provided by the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions,3 each path of doctrinal analysis, con
sidered separately, arguably leads to the conclusion that the proba
tion order is valid. This is so even though a number of institutional,
structural, and process-based considerations converge to render the
order's constitutionality highly suspect. The prevailing doctrinal
approach is to dis aggregate the case into distinct lines of argument.
Do the poor constitute a "discrete and insular minority"? The arti
cles by Professors Richard Cole, David Papke, and Bruce Miller
take up the challenge of considering historical, legal, and cultural
approaches to poverty. Are probation conditions subject to height
ened scrutiny? Professor Jennifer Levi argues, in part, that even a
radical change in the standard of review would not change the out
come of either the majority or dissenting opinions. Is this a case
involving discrimination based on sex? Professor Jennifer Martin
considers the impact that the Oakley decision may have on women,
especially those subject to domestic violence.
How is it possible that the machinery of constitutional inter
pretation gave us this result? These articles suggest that there is no
single answer. In fact, one failing of our current mode of constitu
tional inquiry is apparently that the legal analysis tends to consider
only one variable at a time. Each of the individual inquiries above
me be rejected in turn, without consideration of the interconnected
and overarching issues raised by the case. This symposium provides
us with the opportunity to do just that. Taken as a whole, the arti
cles raise even larger, more systemic concerns. What is the judici
ary's role in interpreting the Constitution? Is it relevant that the
claimed violation stems from a judicial, rather than legislative act?
How should the Constitution safeguard the rights of the least em
powered in society? Because only one other case to date has up
held restrictions on procreation as a condition of probation,4 the
Oakley decision could be dismissed as nothing more than an aber
rant result from the supreme court of a single state. As these arti
cles demonstrate, however, the questions raised by Oakley are
precisely some of the central concerns that underlie the Constitu
tional project itself.
3. There is a strong argument that the doctrine f unconstitutional conditions ap
plies in Oakley. See generally Jennifer Levi, Probation Restrictions Impacting the Right
to Procreate: The Oakley Error, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 78 (2004).
4. See Levi, supra note 3, at 88-89.
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In considering the clash of liberty (or liberties) in Oakley, Pro
fessor Richard Cole rejects the classic liberal constitutional focus on
the protection of individual autonomy from intrusion from the
state. Instead of assuming that individual and community interests
necessarily diverge, Professor Cole looks to Biblical and Talmudic
law and ponders whether preferable resolutions may be possible in
Mr. Oakley's situation using Iubilean principals of liberation and
empowerment. 5 The Iubilean Year, described in the Old Testa
ment, envisioned a radical socio-economic transformation. Con
ceived of as a sabbatical year to occur once every half century, the
Iubilee Year was meant to liberate citizens from forms of bondage
debt and slavery. While the Iubilean liberation was a radical act, it
was also a conservative movement with the goal of restoring tradi
tional community. For Cole, the potential of Iubilean principles
rests in the joinder of individual freedom with the needs of the
wider community.
Viewing Mr. Oakley's poverty as a form of bondage, Professor
Cole considers what the application of Iubilean principles might
mean for David Oakley. Cole posits that, using a Iubilean ap
proach, judges and other lawmakers would attempt to empower the
individual by considering his or her social, economic, and cultural
circumstances. Analogizing redistribution of land in the Mosaic
world to the contemporary emphasis on education as the key to
economic independence; Cole states, for example, that lawmakers
should allocate greater community resources towards education,
job training, and financial support. 6 Because the purpose of the
Iubilean approach is to empower individuals by removing obstacles
that impede success (rather than to coerce conformity with particu
lar standards of conduct, as under the criminal system), the Iubilean
model may give individuals an opportunity to flourish, and, hope
fully, to give back to the community that has supported them.
The article by Professor David Papke ties in nicely with Profes
sor Cole's consideration of empowerment. Professor Papke criti
cizes the assumption, which he finds in the Oakley majority and
dissenting opinions, that "Oakley is an agent rather than a victim of
poverty."7 Mr. Oakley, born in the prison where his mother was
incarcerated, had repeated run-ins with the police from a young
5. See Richard P. Cole, Liberation and Empowerment: A Jubilean Alternative for
State v. Oakley, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 27 (2004).
6. Id. at 59-63.
7. See David Ray Papke, State v. Oakley, Deadbeat Dads, and American Poverty,
26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 26 (2004).
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age. With Mr. Oakley's story in mind, Professor Papke considers
the development of child support law and the current legal focus on
so-called "deadbeat dads." Papke concludes that many child sup
port laws reflect an animosity towards non-paying parents with lit
tle interest in a parent's actual ability to pay: the statute
disparagingly entitled "Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act," for in
stance, creates a presumption that a delinquent parent is able to pay
the support owed. s For the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Papke as
serts, Mr. Oakley had come to personify not just all "deadbeats"
but also the evils associated with poverty itself. Professor Papke
compares the individualist notion of self-reliance inherent in the
American legal system (which blames the "fault" of poverty on
those impoverished) with the structural view of poverty more prev
alent in Europe (which posits that the social and governmental sys
tems failed those who are poor). In the end, Papke turns to
academics, urging us to move beyond the "sterility" of poverty-re
lated discourse and instead to re-examine our understanding of
poverty and its causes. 9
Professor Bruce Miller takes another look at history. He
traces the child support laws under which Mr. Oakley was convicted
to the Elizabethan Poor Laws enacted in England during the six
teenth century.lO By providing a small measure of financial support
for those living in poverty, the Elizabethan Poor Laws incorporated
the concept of public fiscal responsibility towards the poor while
enacting a form of recompense-ostensibly the improved moral
character of the impoverished, who were pilloried as "idle
vagabonds."11 The Poor Laws required that recipients engage in
"continual labor" or face imprisonment. 12 They also established a
set of family law rules unique to the poor. While wealthy or self
supporting parents had no obligation to support their children, par
ents living in poverty were assessed monthly child support pay
ments.13 Professor Miller contends that the stigmatic notion of the
so-called "welfare queen" continues this ritualized degradation of
the poor and functions to deter poor persons from utilizing the as
sistance available. 14 He also notes that the effects of a poverty
8.
9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 26.
Bruce K. Miller, A Sturdy Rogue, 26 W.
Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. at 120-21.
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based dual system of child support continues, pointing to the 1996
Welfare Reform Act's requirement that the prosecutors pursue
non-supporting parents who receive public assistance. Given lim
ited prosecutorial resources, enforcement tends to be aimed at the
poor, while middle and high income parents who fail to pay support
often escape prosecution. The goal of the Elizabethan Poor Laws
and the current welfare system, Miller asserts, extends even further
than deterring those is poverty from accessing public support: by
punishing the poor, these laws function as a reminder to low wage
laborers that there is "a fate worse" than their daily struggles in
underpaid and often demeaning jobs. IS
Professor Jennifer Martin considers another marginalized
group, adversely impacted by the Oakley decision: women. In fact,
there is a significant overlap between these two groups: as the
Oakley majority makes clear, a disproportionate number of single
parents living in poverty are women, and one of the court's primary
rationales for its ruling is to help ensure that impoverished women
and children receive the support they need. 16 Professor Martin ex
pands upon the dissenting opinions in Oakley, which point out that
the probation condition involves not only Mr. Oakley's procreative
choices but those of his pregnant partnerP In addition to creating
a situation "coercive of abortion" by conditioning eight years im
prisonment of Oakley on the birth of his child, the probation order
subjects his partner to potential violence or other forms of intimida
tion by creating an incentive for Mr. Oakley to demand that his
partner terminate her pregnancy.18 Professor Martin places partic
ular focus on the chain of destructive consequences that may result
for victims of domestic violence. An abuser may use every form of
physical, economic, and legal coercion available to harass or control
his partner. He may coerce her to terminate her pregnancy. If she
and the batterer have other children, he may attempt to use the
judicial process to fight aggressively for custody. The abuser may
harass her at work, making it impossible for her to keep her job; he
15. Id.
16. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Wis. 2001). For an examination of in
tersectionality issues and the ways in which the law dis aggregates the harms flowing
from discrimination based on an individual's membership in multiple oppressed groups,
see Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN L. REv. 1241 (1991).
17. Jennifer Martin, Coercive Abortions and Criminalizing the Birth of Children:
Some Thoughts on the Impact on Women of State v. Oakley, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
65 (2004).
18. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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may seek prosecution under child support laws if she is unable to
pay. In effect, an abused woman may be driven into poverty: the
Oakley decision may be harming the very people whom the court is
trying to help.
Professor Jennifer Levi situates the Oakley decision in the con
text of probation conditions imposed nationwide. After surveying
probation cases, Professor Levi concludes that although the result
in Oakley may be unusual, its analytical approach is straightforward
and unremarkable. While the majority and dissent appear to pre
sume that the standard of review is the major point of contention,
Professor Levi notes that whether applying strict scrutiny or ra
tional basis review, the majority would uphold the probation re
striction while the dissent would strike it down,19 This consistency
in outcome, despite the standard applied, leads Levi to search for
another explanation for the unusual result in Oakley. She finds her
answer in the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The doctrine
prohibits the state from conditioning a discretionary benefit on the
infringement of a fundamental righPO The heart of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions is the premise that the government may
not do indirectly that which it is forbidden to do directly. Under
the doctrine, Professor Levi reasons, the state may not impose
greater restrictions on a probationer's fundamental rights (in the
guise of conditioning the "benefit" of probation on the govern
ment's impairment of a right) than it could impose on the rights of
an incarcerated person. Relying on the Supreme Court decisions
Turner v. Safley and Zablocki v. Redhail, in which the Court struck
down restrictions on an inmate's right to marry, Levi concludes that
similar infringements on a prisoner's equally fundamental right to
procreate would also fail,21 Because the ban on Mr. Oakley's abil
ity to procreate would be unconstitutional if applied to Mr. Oakley
as an inmate, then under the doctrine of unconstitutional condi
tions, Professor Levi concludes, the infringement must fail when ap
plied to him as a probationer.
Each of these articles implicates a broader, institutional diffi
cUlty: the failure, not limited to the Oakley court, to consider in any
meaningful way the role of judicial decision-making in the context
of probation. While courts have rejected arguments urging height
19.
20.
21.
Redhail,

Levi, supra note 3, at 92-93.
Id. at 100.
/d. at 98-100 (discussing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), and Zablocki v.
434 U.S. 374 (1978)).
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ened review of probation orders, the typical considerations that
provide the basis for judicial restraint are largely absent for the re
view of probation orders. In contrast to review of legislative or ad
ministrative actions, in which judicial deference to the decisions of
co-equal branches of government is generally warranted, probation
orders do not directly raise separation of powers concerns. Proba
tion conditions are often set by a lower court judge who has largely
unfettered discretion in crafting her order. Unlike legislation,
which reflects the will of the majority arrived at via the democratic
process, a probation order (at its worst) may be little more that the
imposition of the idiosyncratic preferences of an individual judge.
Moreover, the judicial deference normally granted to prison offi
cials is not appropriate for probation orders. Probation orders not
only originate from the same governmental branch that later re
views them: the orders are issues by the very branch presumably
lacking the specialized expertise that is the basis for deference to
prison authorities.
Another consideration that militates towards exercising greater
judicial solitude is the obvious concern that a constitutional right is
at stake. Without rehashing the arguments in Oakley regarding
whether the right to procreate necessarily requires the application
of strict scrutiny, a quick reference to Marbury v. Madison should
be a sufficient reminder that it is particularly within the province of
the judiciary to safeguard constitutional rights. 22 Nor is this just any
old "bargain basement" constitutional right. The right to reproduc
tive freedom is among the most culturally important and embattled
of our constitutional guarantees-one need only follow the nomina
tion process for the federal bench for evidence of its significance. 23
As Professor Martin discusses-and as is suggested by the gender
split among the Oakley jurists (with the four male justices voting to
uphold the constitution and the three female justices voting to
strike it down)-it is also a right that implicates sex equality con
cerns. In particular, the possibility that Mr. Oakley might attempt
to control his partner's reproductive decisions is precisely the out
come the Supreme Court prohibited in the context of spousal con
sent requirements for abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.24
Even though it did not undertake a traditional sex discrimination
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
23. A federal judicial nominee's (dis)agreement with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 503 U.S. 833 (1992), is often considered to be
a litmus test for the likelihood of a nominee's Congressional confirmation.
24. Casey, 505 U.S. at 888-89.
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analysis, the Court's nullification of the spousal consent require
ment reflected a rare recognition by the Court of the entrenched
inequalities of gendered power. It is also an even rarer, albeit indi
rect, implementation of the process and anti-subordination con
cerns emanating from that most famous of dicta, CaroLene
Products' footnote four. 25 Similarly, the OakLey court could have
struck down the probation order (without the necessity of holding
that this was a sex discrimination case, simpliciter) on the ground
that the order may impermissibly result in the subjugation of Mr.
Oakley's female partners through violence and the loss of repro
ductive control.
A final factor militating towards heightened judicial solicitude
is that Mr. Oakley, like many probationers, lives in poverty, as do
the women with whom he has had relationships, and the children
they have borne. Does the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision
create the reproductive equivalent of a debtor's prison? The an
swer appears to turn on the interpretation of the probation order:
does it, as the order's language suggests, prohibit Mr. Oakley from
fathering children until he can support all of them, or does it, as the
majority concludes, require him to make some effort to pay?26 The
latter implies that Mr. Oakley "holds the key" and could avoid the
restriction by paying what he can afford. The former effectively
operates as an absolute ban on future procreation because the facts
indicate that Mr. Oakley is unable to fully support his children. 27 I
would argue that the "correct" answer to this question is less impor
tant than the question itself. When a right so integral to our indi
vidual autonomy could be completely barred, consideration of the
judiciary's role suggests that it err on the side of ensuring constitu
tional protections. Even though the Supreme Court has long re
fused to grant increased scrutiny of governmental action that
unduly burdens the poor,2s the discussions by Professors Papke and
Miller concerning the historical and ongoing hostility to the poor
demonstrate that the process concerns animating footnote four ap
ply with particular force to those living in poverty.

25. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4 (1938).
26. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202-03.
27. Id. at 208.
28. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. V. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (rejecting
the proposition that wealth-based classifications are suspect). For a critique of the Su
preme Court's reasoning in this case, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal:
American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1461 (2003).

